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_____________________________________________________________ 
 
Abstract 
 
This article examines the impact of financialisation on the income shares of the 
top 1% from 1990-2010, through a panel analysis of 14 OECD countries. 
Drawing together literatures stressing the dependence of income inequality on 
the structural bargaining power of capital relative to labour, and of the 
dependence of accumulation on underlying institutionalised modes of state 
regulation, it shows that financialisation has significantly enhanced top income 
shares net of underlying controls. Whilst the income shares of the top 1% 
appear responsive to variables typical of wider studies of personal income 
inequality, we emphasise distinctive mechanisms of top income growth linked 
to the rising dominance of financial instruments and actors, facilitated by a 
historically specific regulatory order. These conditions were key to the 
emergence of a state of ‘asymmetric bargaining’ which disproportionately 
enhanced the fortunes of the wealthy. Results thus emphasise the importance 
of class-biased power resources and underlying regulatory structures, as 
determinants both of income concentration and of the distribution of 
economic rewards beyond growth capacity alone. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
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1. Introduction 
 
Financialisation has taken its place as a macro-stressor of income equality on a par with 
globalisation, technological change, and economic development. Kuznet’s predictions of a secular 
return to equality following a disruptive phase of dualist economic growth have not come to pass 
(Alderson and Nielsen, 2002; Piketty, 2014), whilst globalisation has merely hastened a loosening 
of domestic constraints on firm activity, exposing labour to international wage competition and 
the threat of firm relocation (Choi, 2001; Harrison, 2005; O’ Farrell, 2010). Amid profound shifts 
in the global economic order since the 1980’s, it is clear that a limited few have benefitted 
substantially, whilst many have seen their fortunes worsen - a situation brought into sharp relief 
by the socialisation of private debt in the post-crisis years, and the damaging impact of austerity 
on low income groups. Whilst some have stressed the dependence of inequality on capital-
augmenting technological growth and labour substitution (Zuleta, 2012), others have pointed to 
institutional factors such as the strength of labour movements, leftist political power, and state 
welfare intensities (Beckfield, 2006, 2009; Daudey and Garcia-Lenalosa, 2007). Backed by a 
strong and growing empirical knowledge base, the rise of finance has also been identified as a 
stressor of both personal income inequality, and of the division of national income between 
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capital and labour (Kus, 2012; Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013; Stockhammer, 2013; Volscho 
and Kelly, 2012).  
 
The landscape of inequality research has changed drastically on foot of the public exposure 
generated by Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014), wherein he outlines a model of 
income inequality which positions wealth accumulation as an inherent, rather than aberrant 
feature of capitalist history. Piketty links this accumulation to a fundamental divergence, where 
slow growth relative to higher capital returns reduces the volume of investment needed to 
increase personal wealth stocks. Whilst this ratio has remained skewed toward capital returns 
throughout much of human history, it also appears likely to return to such a state if capital 
taxation remains lax, and post-crisis growth remains slow. In some instances the recurrent rise in 
top incomes has been sharp. In the United States, the share of income accruing to the top 1% of 
earners began to climb in the 1980’s following a post-war slump, today bringing it to levels not 
seen since the close of the First World War (Volscho and Kelly, 2012, p. 679). The implications 
of Piketty’s framework for analyses of top incomes are profound. As the ratio of capital gains to 
growth, and ratio of capital to labour income both appear responsive to specific policy epochs, 
the social embeddedness and historical contingency of inequality is strongly asserted. 
Furthermore, as Piketty links the imbalance of capital-labour income and recent executive pay 
growth to the loosened bargaining constraints of top earners, it is useful to question what 
precisely has underpinned this inequality at the meso-level. This article argues that useful answers 
may be sought by focusing more clearly on asymmetries in power resources and the bargaining 
power of capital relative to labour, allied to a unique regulatory order which has underpinned top 
income growth since the 1980’s. In doing so, it suggests that the historical specificity of these 
factors, and the mechanisms underpinning wealth accumulation since the 1990’s, are usefully 
captured by the concept of financialisation. 
 
Financialisation has been conceptualised in a variety of ways, such as the diversification of firms 
into financial activities away from core ‘real economy’ pursuits (Krippner, 2011), the growing use 
of securitisation and tradable financial instruments as distributors of risk (Movitz and Allvin, 
2014), a realignment of corporate strategies in favour of profiteering and cost saving (Thompson, 
2003; Thompson, 2013), and the use of credit to shore up consumption under real wage 
stagnation (Guttman, 2008; Kus, 2013a; ILO, 2013; Stockhammer, 2012; van der Zwan, 2014). In 
terms of class structure, the era of financialisation has been characterised by the rise of what 
Foster and Holleman (2010) term a ‘financial power elite’, deriving their wealth from financial 
profits, real estate, and executive compensation. Allied to such works on the general dynamics of 
finance-driven capitalism, a growing body of research has brought renewed attention to the 
structural powerlessness of labour relative to capital, and the institutionalisation of liberal 
regulatory order since the 1980’s, factors strongly linked to greater accumulation at the top of the 
income distribution (Diwan, 2001; Guscina, 2006; Kristal, 2010). The growing powerlessness of 
labour since the birth of the era of financialisation in the 1980’s has been closely linked to the 
weakening of the labour movement under the combined pressures of service sector growth, 
labour market deregulation, and the loosening of capital restraints as an engine of post-Fordist 
economic growth (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003, Jayadev, 2007; Jessop 2001, 2013; Tabb, 2010). 
It thus appears that the fortunes of the ‘winners’ of finance-driven capitalism have clear social, 
political, and policy underpinnings. 
 
Evidence for financialisation’s specific impact on inequality continues to grow. Whilst 
financialisation is shown to exert a strong depressive effect on wage shares (Stockhammer, 2013), 
Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez (2010) are emphatic on the role of politics in determining top income 
movement. This model of politically, rather than market determined income distribution accords 
with rent theory accounts of the financial sector’s increasing share of national income. 
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Consequently, researchers in this vein note how market equilibria are politically structured, and 
that income advantage above market rates is often secured through political manipulation of 
regulatory structures (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin, 2011, p. 541). Beyond macro-level accounts of 
top income growth linked to growth and capital return rates, these accounts lend strong credence 
to a power resources explanation of top income capture. 
 
The rise of top income shares is of immediate practical concern. Whilst Stockhammer has 
demonstrated the slowdown effect of financialisation on accumulation and investment (2004), 
Piketty’s illustration of the long-run dynamics of capital relative to national income suggests that 
without political intervention to effect greater redistribution, inequality may undermine the very 
basis of democratic legitimacy (2014). Tomaskovic-Devey et al (2014) estimate that 
financialisation has had an overall negative impact on non-financial sector output, where the 
resulting falloff in employment was borne by core labour, and where senior corporate officers 
netted gains from compensation packages linked to capital income. If the net effect of 
financialisation is merely to induce greater economic exposure to middle and low-income earners 
through debt incumbency and macroeconomic instability, an understanding of the factors driving 
this disproportionate capture of reward by top earners is therefore urgently needed. 
 
This article examines the impact of financialisation on top incomes, based on existing research 
into the dynamics and drivers of income inequality. It draws on literatures identifying the 
asymmetric balance of bargaining power between capital and labour as a key determinant of the 
distribution of economic reward, and on research into the embeddedness of economic growth 
within ‘social structures of accumulation’ comprising historically-specific regulatory orders, 
modes of economic governance, and orientations to redistribution and social protection. With 
the exception of Dunhaput (2015) who focuses on a different set of financialisation and 
corporate governance related predictors, and Volscho and Kelly’s (2012) and Hicks’ (2014) 
studies of U.S. top incomes, this study is among the first to examine in a panel context, the 
impact of financialisation and financial regulation on the 1%. Using panel models of 14 OECD 
countries from 1990-2010, it argues that financialisation influences top incomes through two 
principal domains: (1) by altering the balance of bargaining power between capital and labour, 
and (2) through state regulatory controls and redistributive mechanisms. Interpreting these results 
within a regulation framework thus confronts certain limitations in Piketty’s treatment of class 
relations and power asymmetries in his account of top income growth, whilst pointing toward 
specific policy domains through which institutional change may effect greater equality of 
outcome, beyond taxation alone. 
 
2. Financialisation and income inequality 
 
Why focus on top incomes specifically? Studies of inequality to date have largely taken the 
personal income distribution as their key outcome, and this has indeed fostered the construction 
of a useful body of theory which relates overall inequality to stressors such as globalisation, skill-
biased wage premiums, and collective bargaining capacity. Whilst others have begun to open up 
the class politics of inequality by taking a closer look at the share of GDP accruing to labour and 
capital (Kristal 210, Stockhammer 2013), they tend to obscure the internal composition of the 
‘capital’ grouping somewhat, by relying on aggregate summaries of capital derived from national 
accounts. Isolating top earners from the personal distribution is thus particularly warranted in 
light of their interdependence with other components of the income distribution, where 
outcomes for one group may affect the other (Atkinson 2007). This is not merely a ‘functional’ 
relationship where the personal distribution responds mechanically to increases in upper fractiles, 
and the financialisation literature discussed below underscores the uniqueness of mechanisms of 
top income enhancement, as distinct from those which drive inequality across the distribution as 
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a whole. In the context of financialisation, we thus find that substantial monetary gains tend to 
centre on resource-endowed individuals at the top of the distribution. Conversely, research on 
the impact of financial managerialism on working conditions reinforces this notion of 
interdependence between income groupings, by suggesting that the remaining ‘resource-poor’ 
have suffered with greater debt burdens, and poorer working conditions (Tomaskovic-Devey and 
Lin, 2011).  
 
The income composition of the 1% is also distinct from that of the wider income distribution, 
with greater shares of rentier and entrepreneurial income (Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez, 
2013). The diversity of their income streams aside from earned income alone thus points to their 
coherence as a distinct ‘class’, a dimension often neglected in analytical work which has tended to 
focus on the 1% as merely another indicator of income inequality, rather than a distinct social 
group. There is a growing realisation however that top earners form not only a particular 
statistical fractile, but a distinct social group with unique mechanisms of reproduction (Roine and 
Waldenstrom 2010, p. 300). Using individual and firm-level data for the U.S., Kim, Kogut and 
Yang (2015) have shown how high pay diffused among CEOs through status competition, 
facilitated by social networks and peer group influence. This important individual mechanism 
operated within a wider context of structural change such as the growing use of stock options for 
compensation and the reduction of top marginal tax rates, both of which feature strongly in the 
financialisation literature considered below. The ‘functional interdependence’ of this fractile 
grouping relative to the wider income distribution, and the mechanisms identified by Kim, Kogut 
and Yang (2015) suggest that financialisation may play a particular role in top income 
accumulation, in a manner qualitatively and quantitatively different from that of other ranges of 
the personal income distribution.  
 
The political urgency of unpacking the drivers of this group is evident even within social 
democracies with historically high levels of resilience to inequality such as Finland, which have 
seen substantial increases in their personal income inequality (Gini), driven strongly by rising top 
income shares (Jantti, Riihela, Sullstrom and Tuomala 2010). There is also an important empirical 
issue concerning the omission of the 1% from studies of the personal income distribution. Given 
the substantial variance of the income shares of the 1% which account for up to 30% of the total 
income distribution, studies which exclude this (i.e. through underestimations of this groups 
associated with survey data), may offer a misleading account of the drivers of income inequality 
(Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez, 2013). The following section thus reviews the current state 
of knowledge surrounding the domains of financialisation-related income redistribution. It 
attempts to draw out mechanisms of association by linking various aspects of the general 
narrative of financialisation to the concentration of top incomes, whilst identifying relevant 
indicators. 
 
2.1. Financialisation and worker’s collective bargaining power 
 
Close connections have been established between the rise of finance-driven capitalism and the 
falling share of GDP accruing to workers as pay (Stockhammer, 2009, 2012, 2013). This 
imbalance in the ‘factor’ distribution of income between capital and labour, which has risen 
consistently across capitalist democracies since the 1980’s (Kristal, 2010), has allegedly created a 
disjuncture between economic performance and the spread of its financial rewards, which have 
disproportionately accrued to high earners (Atkinson, 2009). The pace of this disjuncture has 
been especially strong in the financial sector, where top compensation has surged relative to 
other sectors (Kus, 2012). Specific connections between financialisation and top income 
movement may thus initially be established in two ways. A more direct route suggests that 
profiteering in core financial sector activities disproportionately benefitted top earners by 
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delinking pay from performance-related indicators, and through the provision of market-based 
compensation packages linked to stock options (Thompson, 2013). A more abstract driver of top 
income growth may be identified in the growing literature on the relative bargaining power of 
capital and labour, and its role in income redistribution. Although typically treated separately, in 
reality these are two sides of the same coin, insofar as both are implicated not only in greater 
capture toward the top of the personal income curve, but in the consolidation of structural 
conditions reflecting a real shift in the capacity of institutions and actors to effect greater equality 
of outcome. Whilst the former is well represented in the financialisation literature, the latter 
requires some contextualisation in order to provide a clearer conceptual link to top income 
movement. 
 
The period from the late 1970’s to 2008 saw substantial growth in capital’s share of GDP across 
the OECD, with a corresponding fall in labour’s (Bentolia and Saint-Paul, 2003; Decreuse and 
Maarek, 2008; Ellis and Smith, 2007; Harrison, 2005; Kristal, 2010). As globalisation and 
structural adjustment in the postwar era opened new markets for consumer goods, it also 
introduced wage competition as industrialising regions became attractive destinations for 
corporations seeking to cut their labour costs (Harrison, 2005). The 1970’s-1980 also saw an 
increasing penetration of labour-saving technology into the labour process, public spending 
retrenchment, extensive labour market deregulation, and capital account liberalisation under 
successive neoliberal governments. The result was a weakening of traditional labour protections, 
and the consolidation of policy regimes which would later underpin the growth of financial 
sectors within many capitalist democracies (Jayadev, 2007; Rueda and Pontusson, 2000). Under 
the influence of such stressors, capacities for collective solidarity were weakened as 
deindustrialisation across the developed North eroded traditional bulwarks of unionism. 
 
In tandem with this shift in capital’s fortunes, how has financialisation particularly enabled the 
wealthiest to increase their income share on foot of labour’s growing structural powerlessness? 
The hypothesised intermediary role of relative bargaining power is readily assimilable to the 
financialisation literature. Boyer was among the first to explore the distributional consequences of 
financialisation, providing a theoretical link between the rise of financial markets and shareholder 
power, and the dynamics of income distribution in the post-Fordist era (Boyer, 2000). 
Accordingly, he identifies a ‘reactive wage labour nexus’ under finance-led growth, as a 
replacement for the comparatively stable social compacts of Fordism (Boyer, 2000, p. 117). This 
dual weakening of labour’s capacity to extract its stable factor share, coupled with a shift in 
bargaining power from labour to firm is consistent with Thompson’s model of financialized 
corporate strategies ‘disconnected’ from human capital concerns (Thompson, 2003, 2013). Under 
this ‘shareholder value’ regime, financial incomes such as dividends, interest payouts, and capital 
gains have risen whilst financial globalisation has eroded workers share of economic rewards 
(Stockhammer, 2013).  
 
Accordingly, CEO pay is now 262 times that of the average worker, with stock options 
comprising a sizeable proportion of compensation packages (Kus, 2012, p. 485). The 
corresponding rise in the financial sector’s share of profits, coupled with strong growth in rentier 
incomes linked to ownership of financial assets, thus suggests a profound upward transfer effect 
related to the rise of the financial sector (Epstein and Power, 2003; Volscho and Kelly, 2012). 
Conversely for labour, as real wages remained stagnant during periods of finance-driven growth, 
falling wage shares stifled consumption demand, leading to the emergence in many developed 
countries of a debt-driven growth model where easy access to credit fuelled domestic demand 
(Stockhammer, 2012). Capitalising on the same process which fuelled indebtedness, high earners 
leveraged greater returns by buying into securities, which together generated rising instability in 
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the financial system, whilst decreasing the resilience of low-middle income earners to 
macroeconomic shocks (Guttman, 2008). 
 
Empirical evidence linking financialisation and inequality is substantial, and econometric analyses 
have already demonstrated the potential for higher capital shares of GDP to increase functional 
income inequality. When labour endowments are weak, higher capital shares appear to drive 
personal income inequality higher, and when labour’s bargaining capacity is stronger (i.e. when 
labour’s share of GDP increases), its effect on top quintile income is negative (Daudey and 
Garcia-Penalosa, 2007, p. 18). Similarly, Stockhammer (2013) found strong evidence linking 
financialisation-related variables to an erosion of worker’s share of GDP, results mirrored in Kus’ 
(2012) analysis of its impact on post-tax Gini coefficients. On the basis of these observed 
connections between the factor and functional income distributions, it appears that the relative 
power resources of capital and labour may be central to understanding the rising capture of 
income by top earners. Furthermore, by omitting the mediating role of bargaining power (driven 
by strong financial sector performance since the 1990’s), and its consequent erosion of worker’s 
wage bargaining capacity, an important mechanism in the facilitation of top income capture may 
have been overlooked.  
 
2.2. Financialisation as a social structure of accumulation 
 
There is little doubt that the capital-labour dynamic associated with the era of neoliberal 
financialisation represents a distinct break from other historical epochs of capitalism (Jessop, 
2013). Locating the growth of top incomes within the realm of struggle between capital and 
labour over economic rewards in the labour market represents but one aspect of the politics of 
income distribution however. States and trans-national polities have equally underpinned this 
bargaining asymmetry through the policy measures and distributive mechanisms associated with 
deregulation and financial globalisation. In this sense, regulation theory offers a useful framework 
for thinking through both the systemic underpinnings of inequality as captured by the concept of 
relative bargaining power, as well as the unique institutional and policy frameworks associated 
with the era of financialisation. The assumption of the centrality of regulation forms the basis of 
the ‘social structures of accumulation’ school (SSA) which emphasises the role of states in capital 
accumulation through their maintenance of institutions of law and private property, systems of 
financial exchange and governance, and labour markets (McDonough, Reich, and Kotz, 2010). 
The evolution of the various historical SSA’s is typically treated sequentially. Following the 
demise of Atlantic Fordism with its emphasis on a demand-sustaining compromise between 
capital and labour, SSA theorists identified a successor in the form of a finance-based regime of 
accumulation, predicated on a dis-embedding of capital from regulatory constraints, and a 
commodification of the social wage through cheap credit (Tabb, 2010).  
 
Regulation thus provides a useful theoretical backdrop to the analysis of top income movement, 
as it deals with financialisation not only as a specific regulatory order, but as a logic of capitalism 
inherently disposed toward rising inequality (van der Zwan, 2014, p. 106). While deregulation was 
instituted partly to address post oil-crisis stagflation, it instead ushered a shift from commercial to 
investment banking, and from loans to securities, disproportionately benefitting wealthy investors 
(Guttman and Plihon, 2008). These shifts were underpinned by policy measures including the US 
Monetary Control Act of 1980, later Financial Services Modernisation Act of 1999 (Lin and 
Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013), and the European Second Banking Directive of 1989 (Guttman, 
2008).  
 
The structures of this regime of finance-driven accumulation are well-articulated within the 
financialisation literature. The concept’s insistence on real change in institutional structure is 
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borne out by the disastrous impact of successive finance-driven crisis since the early 2000’s, and 
recognition of the pervasive hand of the state in sustaining financial markets through taxation 
policy and regulation (van der Zwan, 2014). These new institutional and regulatory orders played 
a key role in facilitating top income capture, and the surge in capital gains and rentier income 
noted amongst industrialised countries throughout the 1990’s was predicated on a number of 
regulatory shifts such as capital account openness, which increased capital mobility relative to 
labour since the 1990’s, disproportionately raising capital returns (Epstein and Power, 2003; 
Jayadev, 2007). Growth in profits attributable to financial intermediation and interest income in 
the OECD was driven by anti-inflationary monetary policies which raised real interest rates 
leading to greater capital gains, and deregulation of the financial sector which enabled domestic 
innovation in financial instruments as well as the incorporation of overseas markets for financial 
products (Epstein and Power, 2003, p. 234-235).  
 
While many countries have seen cuts or stagnation in their capital gains and top income taxation 
rates (GINI, 2011, p.93), reliance on regressive redistribution measures such as indirect 
consumption tax often does little to alter the balance of income around the median (Beramendi 
and Rueda, 2007). Piketty provides a compelling link between regulatory regimes and the politics 
of wage bargaining, suggesting that taxation played a key role in determining the capacity of top 
earners to leverage greater incomes. His analysis shows that top incomes correlate weakly with 
productivity, responding instead to lower marginal tax rates which encouraged executives to bid 
for higher compensation without the threat of losing their increases to the state (Piketty, 2014, 
p.508-512). Furthermore, there is worrying evidence that the redistributive capacity of some 
welfare states (the percentage reduction in Gini from market to net income) is falling even 
amongst social democracies such as Denmark which has dropped from 50% in 1995, to 46% in 
2010 (Solt, 2009). These observations suggest that top earners have not only managed to 
capitalise on the opportunities offered by deregulation, but to sidestep the absorption of their 
income by the redistributive mechanisms of the state. 
 
Analyses have also shown how the impact of policy measures associated with financialisation on 
top incomes was specifically channelled through domestic institutional structures, through the 
capacity of the wealthy to affect policy. Volscho and Kelly (2012) found strong evidence for the 
impact of institutional factors on the pre-tax income share of the top 1% in the United States 
since the late 1940’s. Their analysis noted an asymmetry in the power resources of categorical 
income groups, where top income growth was affected first through the capacity of organised 
labour to influence the market distribution of income, and secondly through the capacity of states 
to redistribute through taxation policy and social transfers. It is therefore difficult to attribute the 
growth of top incomes throughout this time to market forces alone given the clear political 
history of the loosening of institutional constraints on financial innovation. Drawing on a 
regulationist-informed view of financialisation thus provides us not only with a mechanism for 
linking regulatory politics to the material accumulation of specific interest groups, but with a 
ready source of indicators such as the spread of the tax burden between capital and labour, the 
capacity of the state to redistribute market income, and the scope of financial sector regulation. 
 
3. Data and method 
 
The following analysis uses fixed effects (within) OLS regression models which control for cross-
unit heterogeneity, on a strongly balanced panel of 14 OECD countries from 1990-2010. This 
specification is appropriate in the presence of between-group inequalities, and when subject-
specific confounding cannot be ruled out (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012). Our analysis 
incorporates countries and variables which are likely to display cross-sectional and temporal 
dependence, given the close economic interrelationships likely to exist between countries and 
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regional polities under trade and financial globalisation (Christophers, 2012). Similarly, controls 
such as trade openness and economic growth are likely to be correlated amongst units with close 
trading dependencies, who may experience common patterns of exposure to economic shocks 
(i.e. the recent financial crisis). To account for these issues, we use Driscoll-Kraay standard errors 
which are robust to heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, and cross-sectional dependence (Hoechle, 
2007, p. 285).  
 
Mindful of issues related to non-stationarity, appendix A reports panel unit root diagnostics, and 
an additional set of tables comparing coefficients with models estimated in first differences is 
available as an online supplement. Given the robustness of the FE estimator with comparatively 
small values of t (Woolridge 2013, p. 472), and potential issues in a minority of specifications 
with missing values, the FE estimator is preferred. As a final robustness check, and to account 
both for temporal lags in the effect of independent variables on top incomes and the potential 
presence of endogenous predictors, we also include a full dynamic specification using the 
Arellano-Bond Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). These models include a lagged 
dependent variable, and all predictors are lagged by a period of one year. Across each of the three 
domains detailed below, variables are selected for inclusion in the GMM specification based on 
their substantive and statistical significance across previous models. Results in the dynamic 
specification are largely consistent with the fixed effects estimator.  
 
The dependent variable is the share of income accruing to the top 1%, sourced from the World 
Top Incomes Database (WTID) (Alveredo, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez, 2014). These data offer 
the advantage of using tax records to estimate top income shares, mitigating issues of 
underestimation often associated with national surveys1. As the individual country series’ adopt a 
common methodology, combining tax data-derived estimates of income with control totals for 
population and income, their cross country comparability is considerably enhanced (Atkinson 
and Sogaard 2013, p. 3). The various top incomes series’ also follow comparable ‘gross income’ 
concepts which are incomes prior to allowable deductions such as interest, depreciation, pension, 
and charitable contributions. They typically include income items such as salaries, wages, self-
employment income, business and farm income, dividends, rents, and interest; fractiles are then 
estimated against a control total often derived from adjusted national accounts totals of personal 
income. Capital gains are treated according to country tax code definitions. In come jurisdictions, 
realized capital gains are assessed under a separate system of returns, whilst in countries such as 
Australia and the U.K., certain gains are considered under regular income tax.  
 
The exclusion of realized capital gains is generally preferred, as realisations of capital income are 
not typical ‘flow’ items but instead form a volatile component of income, with strong periodic 
variations dependent on stock prices. The U.S. offers a good illustration of this, as ‘…capital 
gains are typically very lumpy (they are realized once every few years), so that ranking tax returns 
by income level including capital gains leads to artificially overestimate very top income levels’ 
(Piketty and Saez 2007, p. 195). Furthermore, including realised capital gains risks erroneously 
assigning individuals to top fractiles who only occupy their position at the time of their asset sale 
(Roine and Waldenstrom 2010, p. 314). Most calculations include ‘rentier’ items such as 
dividends, interest, farm income, and rents under their gross income definition however, with 
final income concepts typically comprising labour, capital (interest and dividends), and business 
income, less realized capital gains. The inclusion of these capital items thus allows us to align the 
dependent variable with the narrative of financialisation-related mechanisms of inequality growth. 
These measurement issues are discussed in detail in the country chapters in Atkinson and Piketty 
                                                 
1 Finland’s top income estimates are derived from the Income Distribution Survey for post-2003 figures. Although 
the series relies on sample data, they are sourced from administrative registers of income, taxes, and benefits. This is 
likely to avoid problems of access or ‘opting out’ which hinder conventional survey methodologies.  
 9 
 
(2007, 2010), and appendix B summarises measurement procedures for those countries discussed 
in these volumes. Finally, the reliability of pooling and the suitability of this series for modelling 
is further affirmed by the observation that this income series closely tracks other measures of 
personal income inequality such as the Gini/Atkinson coefficients and income percentile ratios. 
These observations suggest that factors often found to influence the bottom and mid-range of 
the income distribution may have similar effects at the top (Leigh 2007), albeit through 
qualitatively different mechanisms as detailed above. 
 
Inclusion of cases is determined by the availability of complete series from the world top incomes 
database offering an added benefit, as the tax-derived income series of developed nations are 
typically more reliable than those of developing nations (Leigh, 2007, p. 621). Countries included 
in the following analysis are Australia, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New 
Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. Models 
are specified according to the two principal domains which we suggest mediate the impact of 
financialisation on top incomes. As detailed above, the substantive and conceptual scope of these 
domains includes the bargaining capacity of high earners relative to labour (power resources), and 
the embedding of financialisation in regulatory structures (social structures of accumulation). As 
both domains are embedded in bodies of formal theory with supporting econometric works, they 
offer not only a source of explanatory narrative, but specific control variables as elaborated 
below. 
 
 
Table 1. Variable definitions and sources 
Variable Operational definition Source 
Top 1% income share Share of income accruing to top 1% of earners based on taxation data. 
World Top Incomes 
Database (see Appendix 
B).  
Government consumption 
National accounts government consumption as % 
of Gross Domestic Product (sum of collective 
consumption of government incl. public good 
activities, health, and education). 
Penn World Table 
(Heston et al 2012). 
Union density Net union membership as % of wage and salary earners in employment. Visser (2013). 
Economic globalisation 
Weighted percentage index comprising FDI stocks, 
portfolio investment, trade, and income payments 
to foreign nationals. 
Dreher (2006). 
Trade openness Exports and imports as % share of current-price Gross Domestic Product. 
Penn World Table 
(Heston et al 2012). 
Unemployment 
Number of unemployed persons as % total labour 
force (unemployed + those in paid or self-
employment). 
OECD Database. 
Female labour force participation Females participating in labour force as % total female population. OECD Database. 
Market capitalisation of listed 
firms (% GDP) 
Share price times number of shares outstanding of 
exchange-listed domestic companies, as % of GDP 
(Standard and Poor’s data).  
World Bank Databank. 
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Table 1. Variable definitions and sources 
Variable Operational definition Source 
Private sector credit (% GDP) 
Loans, securities, trade credits provided to private 
sector by financial corporations (monetary 
authorities and deposit banks), as % of GDP (IMF 
data). 
World Bank Databank. 
Finance, Insurance, and Real 
Estate Gross Operating Surplus 
(% all sectors) 
Gross Operating Surplus on financial sector 
production activities as % of all sectors, from 
National Accounts data. 
OECD STAN. 
Labour’s share of Gross 
National Income 
Compensation of employees + self-employed 
income (nominal compensation per employee * 
self-employed persons) as % of GDP. 
AMECO. 
Financial globalisation (log) 
Log of external assets and liabilities (sum of 
portfolio investment including equity and debt 
securities, foreign direct investment, debt 
instruments, financial derivatives and reserves) as % 
of GDP. 
Lane and Milesi-ferretti 
(2007). 
Economic growth (real GDP % 
yearly change) % annual change in real GDP. 
Penn World Table 
(Heston et al 2012). 
Capital taxation (% total tax 
burden) 
Levies on capital transfers or assets as % total tax 
burden AMECO. 
Indirect taxation (% total tax 
burden) Taxes on goods and services as % total tax burden. AMECO. 
Net income inequality (Gini) 
Standardised post-tax and transfer Gini income 
inequality, imputed from Luxembourg Income 
Study data. 
Solt (2009). 
Extent of banking sector 
liberalisation 
6-point scale of presence/absence coded 
conditions: restrictions on opening of foreign 
banks, government permission of competition in 
domestic banking market, restrictions on branching, 
limits on bank activities (0=Fully Repressed, 
5=Fully Liberalized). 
Abiad et al (2008). 
Extent of banking sector 
supervision 
7-point scale of presence-absence coded conditions: 
country adoption of Basle capital adequacy ratio, 
independence of supervisory agency, presence of 
onsite examinations, and regulatory coverage of all 
financial institutions (0=Not Regulated, 6=Highly 
Regulated). 
Abiad et al (2008). 
Financial reform index 
Normalised sum of financial reform measures: 
credit controls, pro-competition measures, banking 
supervision, privatisation, international capital 
flows, and security markets (greater value=greater 
extent of reform). 
Abiad et al (2008). 
Top .1% income share Share of income accruing to top .1% of earners based on taxation data. 
World Top Incomes 
Database (see Appendix 
B).  
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Table 2. Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max Obs 
Top 1% income share 8.88 2.74 4.37 18.33 280 
Government consumption 6.80 1.10 4.08 9.46 280 
Union density 37.46 23.31 7.6 83.9 280 
Economic globalisation 75.03 12.12 42.1 97.01 280 
Trade openness 62.87 31.65 16.01 183.29 280 
Unemployment 7.41 3.96 .47 24.17 280 
Female labour force 
participation 52.76 8.05 33.2 64.2 280 
Market capitalisation of listed 
firms (% GDP) 81.72 56.16 10.19 317.03 280 
Private sector credit (% GDP) 115.47 49.5 30.77 232.1 280 
Finance, Insurance, and Real 
Estate Gross Operating Surplus 
(% all sectors) 
31.42 7.05 16.59 47.36 247 
Labour’s share of Gross 
National Income 58.68 5.01 43.82 70.46 280 
Financial globalisation (log) 5.41 .70 4.16 7.54 210 
Economic growth (real GDP % 
yearly change) 4.6 3.37 -10.24 17.6 280 
Capital taxation (% total tax 
burden) .75 .57 .00 4.56 244 
Indirect taxation (% total tax 
burden) 31.82 4.56 20.28 41.9 244 
Net income inequality (Gini) 29.37 4.48 20.75 37.84 280 
Extent of banking sector 
liberalisation - - 1 3 224 
Extent of banking sector 
supervision - - 0 3 224 
Financial reform index .91 .09 .52 1 224 
Top .1% income share 2.91 1.55 .93 8.25 216 
 
 
3.1 Power resources and the capital-labour bargain 
 
Operational definitions, sources, and summary statistics for all variables are provided in tables 1 
and 2. The first set of models assesses the impact of financialisation on top income shares, 
controlling both for institutional protections associated with mitigating inequality, and the extent 
of labour’s power resources. These specifications draw in particular on the work of Kus (2012) 
who notes the positive impact of financialisation on personal income inequality net of bargaining 
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controls such as unionisation, trade openness, and government spending. These parameters also 
attempt to capture a particular asymmetry in power resources linked to bargaining capacity 
identified by Piketty (2014), which has underpinned the ‘property space’ of top earners incentives 
in financialised economies. Sectoral models of the impact of financialisation on senior 
compensation have confirmed this growing asymmetry, by noting strong top income growth 
linked to financialisation, coupled with a negative effect of unionisation (Tomaskovic-Devey and 
Lin, 2013, p. 1308). Consistent with existing studies which have modelled the impact of 
financialisation on the personal and factor distribution of income (Kus, 2012; Stockhammer, 
2013; Volscho and Kelly, 2012), we include trade union density from Visser’s ICTWSS database 
(2013), government consumption as a percentage of GDP from the Penn World Table, and the 
KOF index of economic globalisation compiled from data on trade flows, and trade restrictions 
(Dreher, 2006). This index combines economic integration measures of actual flows (i.e. foreign 
direct investment and income payments to foreign nationals), with measures of restrictions (i.e. 
import barriers and tariff rates). Eight measures are rescaled (0-100) to produce a composite 
index of economic globalisation (Dreher, Gaston and Martens, 2008). Whilst this measure 
captures a wide range of economic integration factors, we also include a direct measure of 
domestic trade openness from the Penn World Table, calculated as the percentage of combined 
imports and exports over GDP. To these are added unemployment, and female labour force 
participation rates drawn from the OECD Structural Analysis (STAN) statistics, as measures of 
cyclical economic downturn (Volscho and Kelly, 2012), and changing labour market composition 
respectively. Economic growth performed weakly in all specifications and was therefore 
excluded, although all coefficients are robust to its inclusion. Furthermore, as these models deal 
largely with labour market-related variables, the effect of weak economic performance is likely to 
be registered through unemployment. 
 
Drawing on literatures which theorise the channelling of financialisation through the workplace 
through intensive, equity-oriented HR practices (Thompson, 2003; Cushen and Thompson, 
2013), we include a measure of the market capitalisation of listed firms, in order to capture the 
effect of firm participation and diversification into financial activities. Given the suggested 
importance of credit in sustaining consumption under real wage stagnation, and the issue of 
rising productivity capture by capital highlighted by the International Labour Organization 
(2013), we include a measure of the volume of domestic credit issued by banks to the private 
sector as an indicator of the growing importance of credit. 
 
In order to capture the importance of finance relative to other economic sectors, we include the 
gross operating surplus of Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate as a percentage of total sectoral 
gross operating surplus taken from the OECD’s Structural Analysis database. While this is a 
preferable measure of financialisation since it captures the growing contribution of finance 
relative to other economic sectors (Krippner, 2011), its coverage ranges from 1990 to 2008. 
Finally, we include the share of Gross National Income accruing to workers as compensation 
(labour’s share), as a core measure of the bargaining power of labour relative to capital. Studies 
have shown the negative impact of labour’s share on personal income inequality (Gini), stressing 
the long-term importance of strong collective bargaining in sustaining greater rewards for labour, 
and a more equitable distribution of income (Daudey and Garcia-Penalosa, 2007; Stockhammer, 
2013). These studies offer strong justification for including labour’s share as an intermediary 
between the determination of an economy-wide income pool, and the politics of its personal 
distribution (Atkinson, 2009).  
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3.2 Financial regulation and redistribution 
 
The second set of models examines the impact of financial regulation and redistributive capacity. 
These models address more pointedly the institutional structures underpinning asymmetric 
bargaining capacity, by testing the extent to which taxation and redistribute capacity may have 
augmented top income growth, by impacting the ability of top earners to realise higher income 
levels (Piketty 2014). According to Piketty, relaxed top income taxation and wider financial 
regulation - theorised above as embedded in a specific historical regulatory logic – played a key 
role in spurring inter-actor wage competition since the 1980’s. These models control for 
government consumption, union density, and economic globalisation, as well as market 
capitalisation as a base measure of domestic financialisation. We also include economic growth 
measured as the yearly percentage change in real GDP taken from the Penn World Table. This 
variable controls for periods of economic volatility, whilst testing for transfer effects linked to 
stronger economic performance (Kus, 2012; Volscho and Kelly, 2012). Models include financial 
globalisation, measured as the log of external assets and liabilities over GDP (ILO, 2013; 
Stockhammer, 2013) in order to capture the dependence of domestic financialized profitability on 
international expansion (Christophers, 2012). The data on financial globalisation are taken from 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), and their coverage extends from 1990-2004. In light of their 
limited coverage, inclusion of this variable is limited to the first model in order to capture its 
unique effect as a component of financialisation, and to maximise panel coverage for subsequent 
models. 
 
In order to assess whether top income growth has proceeded independent of domestic taxation 
measures, and to assess the distributional consequences of different taxation streams, we include 
the extent of capital and indirect taxation as a percentage of the total tax take, sourced from the 
European Commission’s Annual Macro-Economic Database (AMECO). This set of models also 
includes a measure of post-tax and transfer income inequality taken from Solt (2009), in order to 
assess the relationship between underlying personal income inequality rates, and concentrations 
within upper percentiles. Given the greater redistributive capacities associated with more social 
democratic transfer systems, we should expect greater levels of personal income inequality across 
the personal distribution to influence top percentile accumulation (Atkinson, Piketty and Saez, 
2010, p. 706). To account for potential endogeneity, a re-specified model using the income share 
of the top .1% is available as an online supplement, although results in the GMM specification 
are similar in direction. The political basis of redistributive capacity is further emphasised by 
research showing how social expenditure, capital taxation rates, and top income growth are often 
dependent on partisan incumbency, and their disposition to greater or lesser degrees of regulation 
and social transfer (Castles and Obinger, 2007; Volscho and Kelly, 2012). Finally, to assess the 
effect of financial sector regulation, we include measures of the extent of banking sector 
liberalisation, the extent of banking sector supervision, as well as a standardised index of financial 
sector reform, all taken from Abiad et al (2008). Full details of their operational definitions and 
direction of scoring are provided in table 2.   
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4. Results 
 
Table 3. Power resources and the capital-labour bargain 
 Top 1% income share 
 1 2 3 4 5 GMM 
Top 1% (t-1) - - - - - 
.256*** 
(2.63) 
Government 
consumption 
-.530** 
(-2.40) 
-.340 
(-1.66) 
-.619** 
(-2.79) 
-.809** 
(-2.84) 
-.551** 
(-2.84) 
-.100 
(-1.14) 
Unionisation -.059** (-2.18) 
-.081** 
(-2.59) 
-.047* 
(-1.77) 
-.016 
(-.65) 
-.032 
(-1.43) 
-.063** 
(-2.02) 
Economic 
Globalisation 
.054*** 
(3.15) 
.010 
(.57) 
.051*** 
(2.94) 
.038 
(1.06) 
-.020 
(-.51) 
.059 
(1.60) 
Trade openness .017** (2.66) 
.009 
(.87) 
.016** 
(2.58) 
.021*** 
(4.23) 
.006 
(.74) 
-012 
(-.86) 
Unemployment .087*** (3.09) 
.076*** 
(3.42) 
.093*** 
(2.97) 
.074** 
(2.10) 
.059* 
(1.91) 
.057* 
(1.93) 
Female labour force .092** (2.76) 
.081** 
(2.71) 
.078** 
(2.60) 
-.014 
(-.21) 
-.001 
(.03) - 
Market capitalisation - .011*** (6.34) - - - - 
Domestic credit 
volume - - 
.004 
(1.54) - - - 
FIRE gross 
operating surplus - - - 
.185*** 
(3.24) 
.161*** 
(4.02) 
.116*** 
(3.53) 
Labour’s share of 
GNI - - - - 
-.207*** 
(-4.01) 
-.079*** 
(-3.77) 
C 4.053** (2.12) 
7.149*** 
(3.27) 
4.848** 
(2.34) 
5.338 
(.97) 
21.673*** 
(2.87) 
6.710** 
(2.29) 
p-value (F/Chi2) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Obs 272 270 267 241 241 218 
Groups 14 14 14 14 14 14 
R2 .852 .862 .855 .869 .890 - 
*10%; **5%; ***.01% 
 
 
4.1 Power resources and the capital-labour bargain 
 
The labour market-bargaining context of inequality observed in existing studies thus appears to 
hold in relation to top incomes, in light of consistency in the magnitude and direction of controls 
across all specification. Institutional protections such as government consumption and 
unionisation compress top income accumulation, whilst trade openness and economic 
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globalisation appear to benefit top incomes, consistent with studies of the impact of globalisation 
on capital shares which link increasing capital power to technologically-driven productivity 
capture, innovation in financial instruments, capital account openness and trade deregulation 
(Harrison 2005, Jayadev 2005). Unemployment, which captures both cyclical economic 
downturns and the corresponding structural weakness of labour displays positive association with 
top incomes across all specifications. This is unsurprising given the comparative ease with which 
high earners are able to weather economic downturns through reliance on alternative ‘unearned’ 
income streams linked to financial instruments, an effect mirrored in later specifications which 
show positive effects linked to economic growth (Volscho and Kelly, 2012). The accession of 
women to the labour force, a condition associated with accession to low-security, low-skill 
occupations (Kus, 2012) is also unstable across specifications and non-significant in the full 
bargaining model, suggesting these mechanisms may bear more relevance to the wider personal 
income distribution. 
 
The progressive inclusion of different components of financialisation allows us to examine more 
clearly their effects, in tandem with underlying labour market conditions. The positive effect of 
finance-related variables supports our assertion that financialisation has driven top income 
growth through bargaining asymmetry, both by stifling real incomes through demand-sustaining 
debt servicing, and weakening bargaining capacity under decentralised industrial relations. In the 
literature, the growth of debt markets plays an important role as an additional channel for the 
enrichment of top earners through securitisation, aided by innovation in financial instruments 
linked to increasing firm involvement in financial markets. The effects of both market 
capitalisation and domestic credit volume are weak relative to stressors such as unemployment 
and economic globalisation however, with the latter non-significant. The weaker effect of debt is 
curious, considering that rising debt has been linked both to median income stagnation, and the 
substantial rise in publicly-traded debt servicing agencies which would suggest a stronger effect 
(Kus, 2013a). This finding likely reflects Kus’ analysis of the moderating effects of debt, which 
shored up consumption and moderated personal income inequality (Kus, 2013b).  
 
The mechanism of association between top incomes and market capitalisation is perhaps easier to 
establish, although its detected effect remains substantively small. As the ‘disconnected 
capitalism’ thesis is predicted on a divergence of corporate strategies toward share price and 
dividends, the corresponding delinking of executive pay from underlying performances indices 
likely underpins the strong growth of top managerial incomes relative to median wage earning 
(Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013). High-earning hedge fund managers now routinely earn over 
a billion dollars per year (the top 50 of whom are all male), whilst CEO earnings including salary 
bonus and stock option, have been rising since 2010, reaching an average of 10.5 million dollars 
in 2012 (Forbes, 2012). This is despite rising OECD market income inequality, and increases of 
up to 8 percentage points in relative income inequality in countries such as Ireland since the 
onset of the financial crisis (OECD, 2014).  
 
These discrete elements of the financialisation narrative, and their embedding within broader 
logics of economic action, may be better understood through a more fundamental indicator – 
that of the relative importance of the financial sector. This variable forms a crucial context to the 
shifting power resources of economic actors, and its importance is evident in the consistent 
positive effect of FIRE sector operating surplus in our models. The outpacing of FIRE sector 
profits relative to other economic sectors reflects a fundamental shift in the generation of profits 
away from commodities and trade toward financial channels, a process which saw widespread 
dependence of non-financial industries on financial income streams as a profit subsidy (Krippner, 
2005). Whilst the scale of this shift in the structure of profit has long been recognised as a key 
indicator of the conceptual validity of financialisation, it also played a key role in reshaping power 
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relations between interest groups within economic sectors. More general works on the 
distributional consequences of financial sector expansion particularly stress its effect on top-tier 
income capture, through the use of non-indexed performance bonuses and stock options (de 
Serres et al, 2002). As reflected in sectoral-level work on top compensation, the relative weight of 
financial to business receipts hastened a ‘decoupling’ of surplus generation from production, 
enhancing executive compensation while excluding the wider workforce from wage-setting as 
resources were steadily reallocated away from core production (Lin and Tomaskovic-Devy, 2013, 
p. 1294). The consistency of our FIRE variable thus generalises this important structural 
precondition of bargaining asymmetry to the wider pool of advanced democracies. 
 
The distributional consequences of the growing weight of the FIRE sector in economic life are 
further reflected in our findings concerning the effect of labour’s share. Consistent with models 
of the relationship between the factor and personal income distribution, we find a greater share 
of labour in Gross National Income to be associated with a reduction in top income shares. 
Capital income growth has been explained with reference to the rise of growth strategies 
incorporating capital account deregulation (Jayadev, 2007) which are typically investment-
oriented. As a result, greater shares of capital in national income have been associated with 
greater overall income inequality (Daudey and Garcia-Panalosa, 2007). The above results suggest 
that this relationship holds net of underlying bargaining controls, and of the sectoral importance 
of finance. Furthermore, it strongly affirms Atkinson’s (2009) suggestion of giving greater 
attention to the intermediary effects of factor shares as a meaningful moderator of the personal 
income distribution. The balance of labour’s share appears to matter not only as a definitional 
measure of the setting of an economy-wide income pool as per Atkinson, but also as a measure 
of the capacity of labour to effect greater income capture. All specifications thus point toward a 
strong asymmetry in bargaining capacity reflected both in the explanatory and conceptual 
literatures on finance-driven inequality. 
 
 
Table 4. Financial regulation and redistribution 
 Top 1% income share 
 1 2 3 4 GMM 
Top 1% (t-1) - - - - 
.278 
(1.59) 
Government 
consumption 
-.099 
(-.78) 
-.009 
(-.07) 
-.517** 
(-2.57) 
-.593** 
(-2.79) 
.051 
(.27) 
Unionisation -.058* (-2.14) 
-.204*** 
(-7.26) 
-.045 
(-1.20) 
-.047 
(-1.20) 
-.150** 
(-2.57) 
Economic 
Globalisation 
-.042* 
(-2.06) 
.031 
(1.34) 
-.011 
(-.33) 
-.048 
(-1.03) - 
Economic growth .059** (2.31) 
.029 
(1.24) 
.063 
(1.46) 
.070 
(1.59) - 
Market capitalisation .008*** (4.09) 
.009*** 
(8.50) 
.011*** 
(6.99) 
.012*** 
(7.25) 
.005*** 
(2.64) 
Log financial 
globalisation (1990-
2004) 
1.528*** 
(4.47) - - - - 
Capital taxation - -.179** (-2.61) - - 
-.017 
(-.40) 
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Table 4. Financial regulation and redistribution 
 Top 1% income share 
 1 2 3 4 GMM 
Indirect taxation - -.169*** (-4.37) - - - 
Post-tax personal 
income inequality - 
.238*** 
(3.27) - - 
.191 
(1.02) 
Extent of banking 
sector liberalisation 
(90-05) 
- - .546** (2.28) - - 
Extent of banking 
supervision (90-05) - - 
.393** 
(2.59) - - 
Financial reform 
index (90-05) - - - 
.229* 
(2.10) 
.237** 
(1.84) 
C 5.431*** (3.05) 
12.531*** 
(3.51) 
12.950*** 
(3.87) 
12.411*** 
(4.61) 
1.878 
(.44) 
p-value (F/Chi2) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Obs 200 222 214 200 158 
Groups 14 12 14 14 12 
R2 .915 .905 .872 .875 - 
*10%; **5%; ***.01% 
 
 
4.2 Financial regulation and redistribution 
 
The second set of models retains relevant controls from the power resources specification, 
namely government consumption, unionisation, and economic globalisation, in order to include 
institutional power resources as a context for formal regulation. To these are added economic 
growth, both as a test of transfer effects linked to stronger economic performance (Volscho and 
Kely, 2012), and as a precondition of state redistributive capacity linked to fiscal policy, which is 
likely to be responsive to underlying economic performance. As financial market engagement 
provides a theoretical link between the power resources of top earners vis-à-vis formal regulatory 
regimes, its consistency across both specifications net of underlying controls is noteworthy. 
Similar to Stockhammer (2013), we find a particularly strong effect for financial globalisation net 
of other controls. Given that the general weakening of median income associated with 
globalisation is a standard condition of bargaining models of income distribution, it is 
unsurprising that this should also profoundly influence top incomes. This component of the 
globalisation of finance may also be linked theoretically to the mechanism elaborated for market 
capitalisation, where the outward focus of firms and inter-trading of financial instruments forms 
an integral component of the equity-oriented regime of corporate governance. Instrument 
innovation also plays a central role in Piketty’s model of divergent economic growth and capital 
returns as a driver of wealth concentration, where the diversity of capital gains sources outstrips 
regulatory capacity. Together, both market capitalisation and financial globalisation have been 
associated with growing capital mobility, and a diversification of within-firm income streams, 
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both of which appear to substantially augment the share of the top 1%. In a broader sense, 
financial globalisation should also capture the ‘leveraging’ effects of global finance. This has 
consistently been identified as a factor which raised the pre-crisis exposure of national polities to 
volatile financial markets, whilst also increasing the global scale of profiteering, as securitisation 
and deregulation both conspired to erode the domestic limits of financial activity (Guttman, 
2008; Tabb, 2010).  
 
Specification two confirms something of the relationship between different components of the 
overall income distribution identified in our original bargaining models. Both the factor and 
personal distribution of income appear to track closely the shares of the top 1%, with greater 
post-tax and transfer personal income inequality associated with higher shares of income for the 
top 1%. Together, these measures construct a clearer overall picture of the interrelationship 
between different aspects of the income distribution and top income capture, where the rise of 
the rich appears closely connected both to their volume of capital share in GNI, and weaker state 
redistributive capacity (personal income inequality). Higher capital taxes are predictably associated 
with lower top income shares, reflecting the likely dependence of this cohort on interest-bearing 
income. The effect of higher capital taxation may work either by conditioning of investor 
behaviour toward greater consumption, or by direct redistribution through social transfers 
(Volscho and Kelly, 2012, p. 694). The negative direction of indirect taxation is curious, 
considering greater reliance on consumption taxes is typically associated with regressive effects 
on inequality, where poorer households often bear the brunt of such increases. Although the 
distributive effect of various taxation streams depends on underlying consumption habits, luxury 
goods comprise a small proportion of the overall indirect taxation take, with the majority of 
consumption taxes levied on general goods (Bermandi and Rueda, 2007). Although results point 
strongly toward the efficacy of capital taxation and state distributive capacity as factors mitigating 
top income capture, further investigation is clearly needed into the composition of the tax take in 
terms of the spread and general cost of goods and services included. 
 
Banking sector liberalisation, banking sector supervision, and financial reform are all associated 
with growth in top income shares. The finding that all should contribute to top income growth is 
explicable in terms of the content of the measures, and of the general logic of financial sector 
liberalisation and supervision which accompanied financialisation in advanced democracies. 
Firstly, our banking sector variable is likely capturing the emergent effects of firm-level 
liberalisation, whereby restrictions on foreign competition in the banking sector, and on the range 
of permissible activities of banks was substantially relaxed over the timespan of our models. This 
formed an important precondition of the financial crisis, whereby the commercial banking sector 
sought to diversify its income streams in a competitive global market through greater reliance on 
leveraged financial instruments (Ó Riain, 2014, p. 143). This expansion was both facilitated and 
underpinned by a specific logic of ‘light-touch’ regulation which was embedded throughout the 
OECD through policy measures such as the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in the U.S. (Lin and 
Tomaskovic-Devy, 2013), global implementation of revisions to the Basel Accord (Guttman and 
Plihon, 2008), and the harmonisation of fiscal rules and monetary policy under the provisions of 
the European Monetary Union (conditions captured broadly by our latter two variables). These 
institutional diversifications and policy measures have been shown not only to increase the 
volume of exposure of the financial system to high-yield capital markets, but also to drive welfare 
state retrenchment and weaken domestic labour movements, thus driving income inequality 
higher (Beckfield, 2006, 2009). In the post-crisis years it has also become clear that the pace of 
supervision and financial reform were insufficient to keep up with the growing complexity of 
financial instruments. This combination of banking liberalisation and weak governance thus 
appears to have sustained a potent mechanism for top income gains by substantially enhancing 
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the scope of rentier income streams, which form a key element in the income composition of top 
fractiles (Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez, 2013, p. 12). 
 
Further empirical indication is thus given to the process of disembedding described by Jessop 
(2013), where the institutional fixes of post-Fordist accumulation are predicted on political 
measures geared toward loosening constraints on financial capital. These measures have a clear 
political history through policies such as the Basel accord, which triggered widespread use of 
securitisation by financial institutions in an attempt to circumvent its capital adequacy conditions 
(Guttman, 2008). Coupled with the recorded weakening in labour’s share (Kristal, 2010) and 
growth in personal income inequality particularly since the financial crisis (OECD, 2014), the 
above results underline a class-based bargaining model of accumulation, where the political 
control of capital and its regulation has generated uneven advantage with a clear class gradient 
(Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013). Whilst our coefficients on taxation, redistributive capacity, 
and financial globalisation affirm the role of income-related social policy in tandem with 
financialisation, there is clearly a broader politics of distribution at work, as revealed by the 
consistent direction and magnitude of institutional protections and stressors in all specifications. 
The political basis of redistributive capacity is further emphasised by research showing how social 
expenditure, capital taxation rates, and top income growth are often dependent on partisan 
incumbency, and their disposition to greater or lesser degrees of regulation and social transfer 
(Castles and Obinger, 2007; Volscho and Kelly, 2012). 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This analysis contributes two fundamental points to the financialisation debate in particular, and 
to Piketty’s thesis in general. First, given the general responsiveness of top incomes to measures 
of power resources linked to financialisation, our results suggest that wealth concentration must 
be interpreted in terms of relative class-based and institutional power resources. Second, these 
results offer a wider theoretical contribution, insofar as they reassert the necessity of 
conceptualising social change in terms of distinct regulatory regimes – financialisation being the 
most recent. While the preceding results must be cautiously interpreted owing to sample 
limitations, they beg important questions concerning prognosis, as wider trends suggest the era of 
financialisation to be one of the worst in terms of its capacity to enhance inequality. Our 
evidence shows that bargaining asymmetry is driven by a variety of factors beyond fiscal policy 
alone, such as regulatory control, class-based power resources, financial globalisation and 
institutional weakening. Whilst the weight of financial sector profit and productivity has 
continued its upward climb relative to other economic sectors, in many countries – including 
social democracies such as Denmark for example - it continues to outstrip the real economy in 
terms of its contribution to productivity and growth. In light of this complexity, serious questions 
must be asked about the ability of capital taxation measures alone to effect redistribution in the 
absence of a broader reconfiguration of social relations linked to the distribution of economic 
reward (Piketty, 2014).  
 
In light of our findings that FIRE sector surplus constitutes a key predictor of top income 
growth, and its noted role as a contributor to re-shaping the field of bargaining between capital 
and labour, our findings must surely raise questions concerning the ability of a fragmented labour 
movement, particularly in liberal market economies, to effect meaningful equality of outcome in 
an economy yet beholden to elite-dominated finance. This effect is especially concerning since it 
captures a fundamental shift not only in the organisation of capitalist economies, but of the social 
relations under which the struggle for capitalism’s rewards takes place. Recent history has shown 
that the shift toward finance has merely offered a tentative basis for growth, volatility for labour, 
yet according to our results, a reckonable channel for the resource-endowed to augment their 
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fortunes. This analysis further underscores the importance of exploring income in terms of its 
factor and personal distributions, where inequality is driven both by greater capture of national 
product by capital relative to labour, and by a ‘hollowing out’ of protections associated with 
greater redistribution. Questions of class-biased power resources rest at the heart of these 
inequalities, such as control over the setting of fiscal and social policy, allocation of the burden of 
post-crisis austerity, and a deference on the part of stricken governments to financial markets in 
their recovery strategies. 
 
If we are to accept the prognosis following from Piketty’s ‘empirical proof’ of the centrality of 
inequality to a functioning capitalism, the consequences of continued top income growth are 
likely to be dire. Harvey (2013) arrives at much the same conclusion in his diagnosis of the 
principal contradictions of capitalism, where he singles out the unsustainability of compound 
growth in a system dependent on exponential returns. Worse still, the post-war asset devaluations 
identified by Piketty as a principal shock to the fortunes of the wealthy have apparently done little 
to alter the concentration of income in the crisis of our time. Instead, the devaluation of 2008 
estimated by the IMF at one year’s worth of global output, offered but brief pause as property 
and interest-bearing assets remained largely in the hands of the wealthy (Harvey, 2013, p. 234). It 
is therefore ironic that the recent financial crisis has favourably exposed the ‘apparatus of 
exploitation’ embedded in capitalism’s latest ‘phase transition’, lending credence to public debate 
for redistributive measures such as wealth taxation (Moreno, 2014, p. 265). Caution is required in 
generalising these results however. Whilst our choice of data was driven by the need to strike a 
balance between eligible countries from the World Top Incomes Database with relevant 
financialisation indicators, our conclusions are thus limited primarily to ‘advanced capitalist 
democracies’ (Kristal, 2010). However, many of our results are corroborated by other 
decomposed models which have examined advanced countries (Stockhammer, 2013), where 
financialisation has proven a greater boon to capital shares than globalisation, technological 
change, and welfare state retrenchment. 
 
Our results point toward the rising structural weakness of labour in the face of stressors such as 
the globalisation of capital, the erosion of redistributive measures such as collective bargaining 
capacity, strong labour unions, and financial regulation as key culprits in rising wealth inequality. 
Financialisation is implicated heavily in these dynamics, not only as a principal agent in the 
shifting balance of power toward capital, but as a force in the erosion of regulatory control, as 
growth capacity in the developed world shifted from the real economy toward disembedded 
financial activity. Prescriptively, these results suggest that greater shares of state consumption, 
healthy labour movements, tighter regulation and stronger redistributive capacity are central to 
mitigating the effects of top income accumulation associated with financialisation. Further, we 
find strong evidence that this accumulation has been driven by familiar components of the 
financialisation narrative linked to a market-driven ‘disconnect’ between real growth performance 
and top compensation, and a side-lining of labour’s interests (Stockhammer, 2012; Thompson, 
2013). 
 
Although the preceding results identify a common stressor of equality in the form of financial 
globalisation, comparative research suggests that future work may benefit from considering 
variation in the impact of financialisation across different ‘worlds of capitalism’. Denmark’s post-
crisis use of collective private funds for distressed banks for example, contrasts starkly with 
Ireland’s sector-wide deposit and liability guarantee scheme, illustrating the potential importance 
of cross-regime difference between liberal and social democratic political economies (Grossman 
and Woll, 2014). In the Irish case, the post-crisis response further entrenched inequalities 
between income groups by reducing the liabilities of investors, whilst redressing the fiscal balance 
through a wave of austerity policies, targeting public investment and welfare. This is but one 
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example of the potential nuances which may be overlooked by an analysis at this level of 
abstraction. In terms of broader theory, our models suggest that a ‘social structures of 
accumulation’ approach, albeit one augmented to focus on the impact of class-biased power 
resources on inequality, is a productive line of inquiry. As evidence accumulates on the 
importance of the distribution of bargaining power between capital and labour, it is important 
that inequality research pays greater attention to how this bargaining power filters through 
regulatory orders, producing stronger concentrations of economic power and income capture. 
 
References 
 
Abiad, A., Detragiache, E. and Tressel, T. (2008) ‘A New Database of Financial Reforms’, IMF 
Working Paper WP/08/266 
 
Aaberage, R., and Atkinson, A. B. (2010). ‘Top Incomes in Norway’. In Atkinson, A.B. and 
Piketty, T. (eds) Top Incomes: A Global Perspective, Oxford University Press, pp. 448-481. 
 
Arts, W. and Gelissen, J. (2002) ‘Three worlds of welfare capitalism or more? A state-of-the-art 
report’, Journal of European Social Policy, 12, 137-159 
 
Atkinson, A.B.. (2007). ‘The Distribution of Top Incomes in the United Kingdom 1908-2000’. In 
Atkinson, A. B. and Piketty, T. (eds) Top Incomes Over the Twentieth Century: A Contrast Between 
Continental European and English-Speaking Countries, Oxford University Press, pp. 82-140. 
 
Atkinson, A.B. and Leigh, A. (2007a). ‘The Distribution of Top Incomes in Australia’. In 
Atkinson, A. B. and Piketty, T. (eds) Top Incomes Over the Twentieth Century: A Contrast Between 
Continental European and English-Speaking Countries, Oxford University Press, pp. 309-332. 
 
Atkinson, A.B. and Leigh, A. (2007b). ‘The Distribution of Top Incomes in New Zealand’. In 
Atkinson, A. B. and Piketty, T. (eds) Top Incomes Over the Twentieth Century: A Contrast Between 
Continental European and English-Speaking Countries, Oxford University Press, pp. 333-364. 
 
Atkinson,A.B. and Sogaard, J.E. (2013) ‘The long-run history of income inequality in Denmark: 
Top incomes from 1870 to 2010. EPRU Working Paper Series, 2013-01. 
 
Atkinson, A.B. (2009) ‘Factor shares: the principal problem of political economy?’, Oxford Review 
of Political Economy, 25, 3-16 
 
Atkinson, A.B., Piketty, T. and Saez, E. (2010) ‘Top Incomes in the Long Run of History’. In 
Atkinson, A.B. and Piketty, T. (eds) Top Incomes: A Global Perspective, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, pp. 664-760. 
 
Alderson, A. and Nielsen, F. (2002) ‘Globalization and the Great U-Turn: Income Inequality 
Trends in 16 OECD Countries’, American Journal of Sociology, 107, 1244-1299. 
 
Alvaredo, F., and Pisano,E. (2010) ‘Top Incomes in Italy, 1874-2004’. In Atkinson, A.B. and 
Piketty, T.. (eds) Top Incomes: A Global Perspective, Oxford University Press, pp. 625-663. 
 
Alvaredo, F., and Saez, E. (2010) ‘Income and Wealth Concentration in Spain in a Historical and 
Fiscal Perspective’. In Atkinson, A.B. and Piketty, T.. (eds) Top Incomes: A Global Perspective, 
Oxford University Press, pp. 482-559. 
 
 22 
 
Alvaredo, F., Atkinson, A. B., Piketty, T. and Saez, E. (2013) ‘The Top 1 Percent in International 
and Historical Perspective’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27, 3-20. 
 
Alvaredo, F., Atkinson, A. B., Piketty, T. and Saez, E. (2014) The World Top Incomes Database, 
http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/ , 17/2/2014. 
 
Becker, J. and Jager, J. (2010) ‘Integration in Crisis: A Regulationist Perspective on the 
Interaction of European Varieties of Capitalism’, Competition and Change, 16, 169-187. 
 
Beckfield, J. (2006) ‘European Integration and Income Inequality’, American Journal of Sociology, 71, 
964-985. 
 
Beckfield, J. (2009) ‘Remapping inequality in Europe: The Net Effect of Regional Integration on 
Total Income Inequality in the European Union’, International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 50, 
486-509. 
 
Bermandi, P. and Rueda, D. (2007) ‘Social Democracy Constrained: Indirect Taxation in 
Industrialized Democracies’, British Journal of Political Science, 37, 619-641. 
 
Bruff, I. and Horn, L. (2010) ‘Varieties of capitalism in crisis?’, Competition and Change, 16, 161-168. 
 
Bentolia, S. and Saint-Paul, G. (2003) ‘Explaining Movements in the Labour Share’, Contributions to 
Macroeconomics, 3, 1-33 
 
Blanchard, O. and Giavazzi, F. (2003) ‘Macroeconomic effects of regulation and deregulation in 
goods and labor markets’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 879-907 
 
Boyer, R. (2000) ‘Is a Finance-led growth regime a viable alternative to Fordism? A preliminary 
analysis’, Economy and Society, 29, 111-145. 
 
Boyer, R. (2004) ‘New growth regimes, but still institutional diversity’, Socio-Economic Review, 2, 1-
32. 
 
Castles, F. and Obinger, H. (2007). ‘Social expenditure and the politics of redistribution’, Journal of 
European Social Policy, 17, 206-222. 
 
Choi, M. (2001). ‘Threat effect of foreign direct investment in labor union wage premium’, Political 
Economy Research Institute Working Paper No. 27 
 
Christophers, B. (2012) ‘Anaemic Geographies of Financialisation’, New Political Economy, 17, 271-
291. 
 
Cushen, J. and Thompson, P. (2013) ‘Financialization in the workplace: Hegemonic narratives, 
performatvie interventions and the angry knowledge worker’, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
38, 314-331 
 
Daudey, E. and García-Penalosa, C. (2007) ‘The personal and factor distribution of income in a 
cross-section of countries’, The Journal of Development Studies, 43, 812-829 
 
Dale, G. (2010) ‘Social Democracy, Embeddedness and Decommodification: On the Conceptual 
Innovations and Intellectual Affiliations of Karl Polanyi’, New Political Economy, 15, 369-393. 
 23 
 
 
Decreuse, B. and Maarek, P. (2008) ‘FDI and the labor share in developing countries: a theory 
and some evidence’, Groupment de Recherche en Economie Quantitative d’Aix-Marseille – UMR-CNRS 
6579, http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11224/  
 
Dell, F., Piketty, T., and Saez, E. (2007). ‘Income and Wealth Concentration in Switzerland over 
the Twentieth Century’. In Atkinson, A. B. and Piketty, T. (eds) Top Incomes Over the Twentieth 
Century: A Contrast Between Continental European and English-Speaking Countries, Oxford University 
Press, pp. 472-500. 
 
Diwan, I. (2001) ‘Debt as sweat: Labor, financial crises, and the globalization of capital’, 
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/voddocs/150/332/diwan.pdf 
 
Dreher, A (2006) ‘Does Globalization Affect Growth? Evidence from a new Index of 
Globalization’, Applied Economics, 38, 1091-1110. 
 
Dreher, A., Gaston, N, and Martens, P. (2008) Measuring Globalisation – Gauging its Consequences, 
New York, Springer. 
 
Dunhaput, P. (2015) ‘An empirical assessment of the contribution of corporate governance and 
financialisation to the rise in income inequality’ 
http://recursos.march.es/web/ceacs/actividades/miembros/duenhaupt.pdf 
 
Ebbinghaus, B. and Manow, P. (2001) ‘Introduction: studying varieties of welfare capitalism’. In 
Ebbinghaus, B. and Manow, P. (eds) Comparing Welfare Capitalism: Social policy and political economy in 
Europe, Japan and the USA, London, Routledge, pp. 145-167 
 
Ellis, L. and Smith, K. (2007) ‘The global upward trend in the profit share’, Bank for International 
Settlements Working Paper No. 231 
 
Epstein, G. and Power, D. (2003) ‘Rentier incomes and Financial Crises: An Empirical 
Examination of the Trends and Cycles in Some OECD Countries’, Canadian Journal of Development, 
24, 229-248 
 
Farrell, S (2014) ‘RBS pays out £588m in bonuses despite suffering £8.24bn loss’, The Guardian 
February 27th, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/feb/27/rbs-bonuses-loss-pay-
market-rate , 3/3/2014 
 
Flaherty, E. and Ó Riain, S. (2015).  
 
Forbes. (2012) ‘Two Decades of CEO Pay’, http://www.forbes.com/lists/2012/12/ceo-
compensation-12-historical-pay-chart.html  
 
Foster, J.B. and Holleman, H. (2010) ‘The Financial Power Elite’, Monthly Review, 62, 1-19. 
 
GINI (2011) Inequalities Impacts; State of the Art Review, http://www.gini-
research.org/system/uploads/253/original/GINI_State-of-the-Art_review_1.pdf?1308916502  
 
Grossman, E. and Woll, C. (2014) ‘Saving the Banks: The Political Economy of Bailouts’, 
Comparative Political Studies, 47, 574-600. 
 
 24 
 
Guscina, A. (2006) ‘Effects of Globalization on Labor’s Share in National Income’, IMF Working 
Paper 06/294 
 
Guttman, R. (2008) ‘A Primer on Finance-Led Capitalism and Its Crisis’, Revue de la regulation, ¾, 
http://regulation.revues.org/5843  
 
Guttman, R. and Plihon, D. (2008) ‘Consumer Debt at the Center of Finance-Led Capitalism’, 
Texte d’une communication au colloque international organise á Paris par le CEPN at le SCEPA, 
http://www.univ-paris13.fr/CEPN/IMG/pdf/wp2008_09.pdf  
 
Hall, P.A. and Gingerich, D.W (2004) ‘Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional 
Complementarities in the Macroeconomy’, MPIfG Discussion Paper No. 04/5 
 
Harrison, A. E. (2005) ‘Has Globalization eroded Labor’s Share?: Some Cross-Country Evidence’, 
Unpublished working manuscript, http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/39649/ , 4/2/2013. 
 
Harvey, D. (2014) Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism, Oxford University Press. 
 
Heston, A., Summers, R., and Bettina, A. (2012). Penn World Table Version 7.1. Centre for 
International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, 
July 2012.  
 
Hicks, A. (2014). ‘Financialisation and the 1%’, Paper Presented at Conference on Financialisation and its 
Consequences, Instituto Carlos III-Juan March de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad Carlos III de 
Madrid, June 12-13. 
 
Hoechle, D. (2007) ‘Robust standard errors for panel regressions with cross-sectional 
dependence’, The Stata Journal, 7, 281-312. 
 
International Labour Organization. (2013) Global Wage Report 2012/13: Wages and equitable growth, 
Geneva, International Labour Office. 
 
Jantti, M., Riihela, M., Sullstrom, R., and Tuomala, M. (2010). ‘Trends in Top Income Shares in 
Finland’. In Atkinson, A.B. and Piketty, T. (eds) Top Incomes: A Global Perspective, Oxford 
University Press, pp. 371-447. 
 
Jayadev, A. (2007) ‘Capital account openness and the labour share of income’, Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, 31, 423-443 
 
Jessop, B. (2001) ‘State theory, regulation, and autopoiesis: debates and controversies’, Capital and 
Class, 25, 83-92. 
 
Jessop, B. (2013) ‘Revisiting the regulation approach: Critical reflections on the contradictions, 
dilemmas, fixes and crisis dynamics of growth regimes’, Capital and Class, 37, 5-24. 
 
Kim, J.W., Kogut, B., and Yang, Jae-Suk. (2015) ‘Executive Compensation, Fat Cats, and Best 
Athletes’, American Sociological Review, 80, 299-328. 
 
Kotz, D.M. (2003) ‘Neoliberalism and the Social Structure of Accumulation Theory of Long-Run 
Capital Accumulation’, Review of Radical Political Economics, 35, 263-270. 
 
 25 
 
Krippner, G. (2005) ‘The financialisation of the American economy’, Socio-Economic Review, 3, 173-
208. 
 
Krippner, G. (2011) Capitalizing on Crisis: The Political Origins of the Rise of Finance, Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press. 
 
Kus, B. (2012) ‘Financialisation and Income Inequality in OECD Nations: 1995-2007’, The 
Economic and Social Review, 43, 477-495. 
 
Kus, B. (2013a) ‘Credit, consumption and debt: Comparative perspectives’, International Journal of 
Comparative Sociology, 54, 183-186. 
 
Kus, B. (2013b). ‘Consumption and redistributive politics: The effect of credit and China’, 
International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 54, 187-204. 
 
Kristal, T. (2010) ‘Good Times, Bad Times: Postwar Labor’s Share of National Income in 
Capitalist Democracies’, American Sociological Review, 75, 729-763. 
 
Lane, P. and Milesi-Ferretti, G.M. (2007) ‘The external wealth of nations mark II: Revised and 
extended estimates of foreign assets and liabilities, 1970-2004’, Journal of International Economics, 73, 
223-250. 
 
Leigh, A. (2007) ‘How closely do top income shares track other measures of inequality?’, The 
Economic Journal, 117, 619-633. 
 
Lin, K. and Tomaskovic-Devey, D. (2013) ‘Financialization and U.S. Income Inequality, 1970-
2008’, American Journal of Sociology, 118, 1284-1329. 
 
McDonough, T., Reich, M. and Kotz, D.M. (2010) Contemporary Capitalism and Its Crisis, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Moreno, L. (2014) ‘The urban process under financialised capitalism’, City, Online First, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13604813.2014.927099  
 
Moriguchi, C., and Saez, E. (2010). ‘The Evolution of Income Concentration in Japan, 1886-
2005: Evidence from Income Tax Statistics’. In Atkinson, A.B. and Piketty, T. (eds) Top Incomes: 
A Global Perspective, Oxford University Press, pp. 76-170. 
 
Movitz, F. and Allvin, M. (2014) ‘What does Financial Derivatives really got to do with Jobs? 
Examining Causal Mechanisms between Aspects of Financialization, Work Intensification and 
Employment Insecurity’, Paper for ILPC 7-9th March 2014, London 
 
Nolan, B. (2007). ‘Long-Term Trends in Top Income Shares in Ireland’. In Atkinson, A. B. and 
Piketty, T. (eds) Top Incomes Over the Twentieth Century: A Contrast Between Continental European and 
English-Speaking Countries, Oxford University Press, pp. 501-530. 
 
OECD. (2014) ‘Rising inequality: youth and poor fall further behind’, OECD Statistics 
Directorate, http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/OECD2014-Income-Inequality-Update.pdf  
 
O’ Farrell, R. (2010) ‘The Effect of International Trade on Trade Union Density’, European 
University Institute, European Trade Union Institute Working Paper 
 26 
 
 
Ó Riain, S. (2012) ‘The crisis of financialisation in Ireland’, The Economic and Social Review, 43, 497-
533. 
 
Ó Riain, S. (2014) The Rise and Fall of Ireland’s Celtic Tiger: Liberalism, Boom and Bust, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 
 
Piketty, T. (2007). ‘Income, Wage, and Wealth Inequality in France’. In Atkinson, A. B. and 
Piketty, T. (eds) Top Incomes Over the Twentieth Century: A Contrast Between Continental European and 
English-Speaking Countries, Oxford University Press, pp. 43-81. 
 
Piketty, T. (2014). Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 
 
Piketty, T. and Saez, E. (2007). ‘Income and Wage Inequality in the United States, 1913-2002’. In 
Atkinson, A. B. and Piketty, T. (eds) Top Incomes Over the Twentieth Century: A Contrast Between 
Continental European and English-Speaking Countries, Oxford University Press, pp. 141-225. 
 
Rabe-Hesketh, S. and Skrondal, A. (2012) Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling Using Stata, Volume 1: 
Continuous Responses (Third Edition), Texas, Stata Press. 
 
Roine, J., and Waldenstrom, D. (2010). ‘Top Incomes in Sweden over the Twentieth Century’. In 
Atkinson, A.B. and Piketty, T. (eds) Top Incomes: A Global Perspective, Oxford University Press, pp. 
299-370. 
 
Rueda, D. and Pontusson, J. (2000) ‘Wage Inequality and Varieties of Capitalism’, World Politics, 
52, 350-383 
 
Sippola, M. (2010) ‘The Restructuring of the Nordic Labour Process and the Variegated Status of 
Workers in the Labour Market’, Competition and Change, 16, 243-260. 
 
Solt, F. (2009) ‘Standardizing the World Income Inequality Database’, Social Science Quarterly, 90, 
231-242. 
 
Stockhammer, E. (2004) ‘Financialization and the slowdown of accumulation’, Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, 28, 719-741. 
 
Stockhammer, E. (2009). ‘The finance-dominated accumulation regime, income distribution and 
the present crisis’, Department of Economics Working Paper Series, 127. Inst. Fur 
Volkswirtschaftstheorie und politik, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, Vienna. 
 
Stockhammer, E. (2012) ‘Financialization, income distribution and the crisis’, Investigación 
Económica, 71, 39-70. 
 
Stockhammer, E. (2013) ‘Why have wage shares fallen? A panel analysis of the determinants of 
functional income distribution’, International Labour Office, Conditions of Work and Employment Series 
 
Tabb, W.K. (2010) ‘Financialization in the Contemporary Social Structure of Accumulation’. In 
McDonough, T., Reich, M. and Kotz, D.M. (eds) Contemporary Capitalism and Its Crises, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 145-167. 
 
 27 
 
Thompson, P. (2003) ‘Disconnected capitalism: or why employers can’t keep their side of the 
bargain’, Work, Employment and Society, 17, 359-378. 
 
Thompson, P. (2013) ‘Financialisation and the workplace: extending and applying the 
disconnected capitalism thesis’, Work, Employment and Society, 27, 472-488 
 
Tomaskovic-Devey, D., Lin, K.H. and Meyers, N. (2014) ‘Did Financialization Decrease 
Economic Well-Being?’, Paper for ‘Financialization and Its Consequences’, Juan March Institute, Madrid 
June 2014 
 
Van der Zwan, N. (2014) ‘Making sense of financialization’, Socio-Economic Review, 12, 99-129. 
 
Van Rie, T., Marx, I. and Horemans, J. (2011) ‘Ghent revisited: Unemployment insurance and 
union membership in Belgium and the Nordic countries’, European Journal of Industrial Relations, 17, 
125-139 
 
Visser, J. (2013) Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention 
and Social Pacts in 34 countries between 1960 and 2012, http://www.uva-aias.net/207 , 17/2/2014. 
 
Volscho, T. W. and Kelly, N. J. (2012) ‘The Rise of the Super-Rich: Power Resources, Taxes, 
Financial Markets, and the Dynamics of the Top 1 Percent, 1949 to 2008’, American Sociological 
Review, 77, 679-699 
 
Woolridge, J. (2013). Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach. Cengage Learning. 
 
Zuleta, H. (2012) ‘Variable factor shares, measurement and growth accounting’, Economic Letters, 
114, 91-93. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28 
 
Appendix A: Unit root diagnostics 
 
The following table reports panel unit root tests for all relevant interval variables included in the 
model. Unit root tests were performed using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) sub-selection 
of Fisher-type tests. The following tests assume an AR1 autoregressive process, and are repeated 
using demeaned variables to account for cross-unit heterogeneity. For all tests, H0: all panels 
contain unit roots; Ha: at least one panel is stationary. The results indicate that although unit root 
processes appear in a select number of variables, the diagnostics respond favourably to 
demeaning. These results lend further credence to the utility of a within-estimator, as the 
demeaned adjustment also subtracts cross-section averages from individual series. A majority of 
variables - as well as the demeaned dependent variable, government consumption and market 
capitalisation - indicate absent or ambiguous evidence of a unit root amongst all panels. 
 
 
Panel Unit Root Tests (AR1) 
Variable 
Inverse chi-
square (Χ2) 
Inverse 
normal (Z) 
Inverse chi-
square, 
demeaned 
(Χ2) 
Inverse 
normal, 
demeaned 
(Z) 
Top 1% income share 27.37 .26 50.42* -1.11 
Government consumption 74.54* -.10 92.12*** -2.04* 
Union density 154.42*** -2.69** 75.13* .56 
Economic globalisation 158.53*** -7.24*** 69.83 -1.57 
Trade openness 47.61 1.21 57.95 1.1 
Unemployment 106.30*** -4.79*** 125.03*** -4.53*** 
Female labour force participation 61.56 2.13 70.33 -0.40 
Market capitalisation of listed firms 
(% GDP) 67.28 -2.61** 69.77* -2.06* 
Private sector credit (% GDP) 42.03 3.67 48.82 1.84 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 
Gross Operating Surplus (% all 
sectors) 
62.80 1.13 81.97** .14 
Labour’s share of Gross National 
Income 136.72*** -4.02*** 139.87*** -4.57*** 
Financial globalisation (log) 6.43 9.19 26.53 5.55 
Economic growth (real GDP % 
yearly change) 248.09*** -10.95*** 314.36*** -12.58*** 
Capital taxation (% total tax burden) 131.82*** -1.93*** 97.53*** -3.17*** 
Indirect taxation (% total tax 
burden) 126.02*** -4.37*** 134.90*** -4.45*** 
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Panel Unit Root Tests (AR1) 
Variable 
Inverse chi-
square (Χ2) 
Inverse 
normal (Z) 
Inverse chi-
square, 
demeaned 
(Χ2) 
Inverse 
normal, 
demeaned 
(Z) 
Net income inequality (Gini) 137.62*** -3.88*** 134.59*** -4.77*** 
Financial reform index 377.13*** -11.69*** 274.43*** -9.24*** 
Political globalisation 379.98*** -13.21*** 197.00*** -6.11*** 
P ≤ *.05; **.01; ***.001 
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Appendix B: Notes on the measurement of top incomes 
 
Country Measure (income definition, from book) 
Column title 
from WTID 
Australia Tax unit is the individual, control total for population is that 
aged 15 and over, control total for income is national 
accounts total of personal income with non-household items 
excluded (charities, universities, social security contributions, 
non-taxable payments). Australia uses ‘actual income’ 
concept from 1958 (pre eligible deductions). Some gains are 
included under regular income tax, but others are excluded 
(as with UK) since 1986 under separate capital gains system 
(Atkinson and Leigh 2007a). 
Top 1% 
income share 
Denmark Danish statistics offer a number of advantages such as a 
stable long-term tax code, centralised data collection, and 
detailed tabulation. The taxable gross income concept 
excludes realized capital gains, but includes transfers such as 
unemployment and sickness benefit, and public pensions. 
Prior to 1980 where subtle variation is introduced owing to 
the availability of micro-data, the income concept included 
wage income and transfers, stock and dividend gains, and net 
business income.  Tax units from 1970 are individuals aged 
15 and over, and the control totals are derived from the 
actual number of tax units (Atkinson and Sogaard 2013).   
Top 1% 
income share 
adults 
Finland Data are sourced from the Income Distribution Surveys 
(IDS) and Household Expenditure Surveys. Although the 
IDS is a representative sample survey, it draws information 
on income, taxes, and benefits from administrative registers. 
These income estimates include sources such as labour and 
entrepreneurial income, capital income, and received 
transfers. Realised capital gains are taxable after 1993 
reforms, however state capital income tax and property tax is 
subtracted under their income definition. After 1975, jointly 
taxed persons were no longer assessed as a single taxable 
unit. The authors note that rising Gini income inequality has 
been driven strongly by increases in top income shares since 
the 1990s (Jantti, Riihela, Sullstrom and Tuomala 2010).  
Top 1% 
income share 
IDS 
France Tabulations since 1915 list all individual income tax returns, 
and the income concept is pre-tax, pre-deduction taxable 
income. A key feature of the evolving composition of French 
top incomes is a decline in the share of wage income in top 
fractiles, a rising share of capital income (dividends, interest, 
rents). French top incomes thus derive mainly from 
dividends, and large capital owners are predominantly 
shareholders, not bondholders or landlords (Piketty 2007). 
Top 1% 
income share 
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Country Measure (income definition, from book) 
Column title 
from WTID 
Ireland Income definition from 1970 is ‘total income’, which is net of 
capital allowances, retirement annuities, and interest paid. Tax 
unit is the single adult or married couple with dependent 
children, with control population total derived from census 
years through interpolation. Control total for aggregate 
income follows the U.S., where aggregate personal sector 
income from national accounts is adjusted for transfers and 
social insurance contributions. By 2000, self-employed 
income comprised 69% of the income of the top 1% group, 
whilst predominantly unearned income accounts only for 4% 
of top income cases (Nolan 2007). 
Top 1% 
income share 
Italy Calculations are performed on personal income tax data 
compiled by the Italian tax administration, and the income 
concept is gross income before deductions, and including 
income items such as salaries, pension, self-employment 
income, dividends, and real estate. Controls population totals 
are derived from census data, and the tax unit since 1976 is 
the individual. Realized capital gains are mostly excluded, but 
the series some gains from qualified equities. The control 
income denominator is calculated from national accounts 
data on wages and salaries, pensions, business income, and 
non-labour income. The authors note that evasion on wages 
salaries and pensions at the top of the distribution is low, as 
evasion rates tend to decrease with true income. (Alvaredo 
and Pisano 2010).  
Top 1% 
income share 
Japan Data are soured from income tax statistics published by the 
Japanese tax administration, and the income concept is gross 
income before individual tax liabilities, but after employers 
payroll and corporate income tax. This includes all income 
components reported in tax returns, such as salaries and 
wages, business and farm income, self-employment income, 
dividends, interest, and rent, with realized capital gains 
excluded owing to their volatility. The tax unit is the 
individual, and control totals are calculated from counts of 
total adults, and from national accounts figures of total 
personal income. 
Top 1% 
income share 
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Country Measure (income definition, from book) 
Column title 
from WTID 
New 
Zealand 
The tax unit since 1953 is the individual, and the control is 
the number of people aged 15 and over. The income total is 
pre-tax gross income, and the control total is derived from 
adjusted national accounts household income totals, 
including transfers. Realised capital gains are excluded, whist 
dividends are covered by the estimates. An increase of the 
marginal tax rate on incomes over $60,000 from 33% to 39% 
in 2000, led to extensive realisation of business earnings in 
1999, whilst a fully separate system of capital gains returns 
was established during the same tax year (Atkinson and Leigh 
2007b, p. 339). 
Top 1% 
income share 
adults 
Norway The calculation procedure follows closely that of Piketty for 
France. Data on incomes are derived from tax register micro-
data files, supplemented with Income Distribution Survey 
data. Taxation is generally joint, although separate filing for 
two-earner couples has increased. Control totals for 
population include adults aged 16 and over, and the control 
income total relies on national accounts total household 
income data. These include employment income, interest, 
rents, dividends, and transfers.  
 
Top 1% 
income share 
Spain Estimates are compiled from personal income and wealth 
returns to the Spanish fiscal administration, where the tax 
unit since 1988 is the individual. The income concept is gross 
income, pre-deduction, and incorporating all tax schedule 
items such as salaries and pensions, self-employment income, 
business income, dividends, and interest. Although realised 
capital gains are included in the tax base, a series excluding 
them is provided and used for this study. Control population 
totals are derived from census data of total adults, and 
control income totals are derived from national accounts and 
GDP data. Reinforcing the necessity of tax-based 
methodologies, Spanish survey measures have shown a 
reduction in income inequality and relative stability post-
19780, whilst tax-based measures show worsening 
throughout the 1990’s (Alvaredo and Saez 2010).  
 
Top 1% 
income share 
Sweden Income data are derived from annual published income 
distribution statistics, the income concept is all-source gross 
income before taxes and transfers, less source interest 
payments. Although the concept includes realised capital 
gains, the data are structured in a way which allows them to 
be subtracted from the series. The final income total includes 
labour, capital, and business income less realized capital 
gains. Control totals for population and income are derived 
from the adults population recorded by Statistics Sweden, 
and a combination of national accounts data and Swedish tax 
statistics respectively.  
Top 1% 
income share 
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Country Measure (income definition, from book) 
Column title 
from WTID 
 
Switzerland Income definition is ‘Revenu net’ income before deductions, 
which includes employment, business, and capital income, 
excluding realized capital gains. The Swiss tax unit is at family 
level (married couple, or single person with dependents). 
Decennial census’ are used to calculate control population 
totals through interpolation, and the control income total is 
the total of tax returned income with adjustment for non-
returners. This total income is defined as personal income 
including transfers, and after-tax corporate profits after 
distribution of dividends. Switzerland maintains a very low 
top marginal income tax rate (10%); there is no federal 
inheritance or estate tax, and most counties do not levy 
inheritance taxes between spouses, parents, or children. Thus 
the marginal tax rate on local and capital income has been 
very low relative to OECD comparators. Complete tax 
avoision is difficult however, as returns on wealth invested 
are flat-taxed 35% at source. Whilst the use of flat-rate allows 
for a level of secrecy around account ownership, it allows for 
estimates of the proportion of non-Swiss filing income tax 
returns (Dell, Piketty, and Saez 2007). 
 
Top 1% 
income share 
United 
Kingdom 
U.K. tax base figures do not correspond with definite income 
definition, and thus omit most capital gains and losses (note 
that there is a time effect here which lends some confidence 
to the consistency of figures within the timeframe under 
consideration within this study – whilst the effect of capital 
gains and losses over time cannot be assumed uniform as 
verified by the U.S. case, incentives for tax avoidance fall 
within changes to policy, which tend to be less frequent). 
Units for top income estimates are individuals, and the 
control total for income is the total from income tax statistics 
with an added estimate of the income of units not covered. 
In 1997, the share of investment income of the top 1% was 
approximately 12% (Atkinson 2007, p. 110). 
 
Top 1% 
income share 
adults 
United 
States 
Tax unit is the married couple or single adult with 
dependents. Calculations use a gross income definition which 
includes all income items on tax returns before deduction 
(salaries and wages, farm income, dividends, interest, rents). 
Realised capital gains are not an annual flow of income and 
form a volatile component of income with large variations 
dependent on stock prices, thus the preferred series for 
comparability is the series with excluded capital gains (Piketty 
and Saez 2007, p. 144 and p. 195). Piketty and Saez show that 
for the U.S., although measurement and taxation of capital 
gains is important, it is not the primary driving force behind 
changing trends. 
 
Top 1% 
income share 
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Online Supplement 1: Comparison of FE and FD parameter estimates+ 
 
(1) Power resources and the capital-labour bargain 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Government 
consumption 
-.530** 
(-.057) 
-.340 
(-.062) 
-.619** 
(-.065) 
-.809** 
(-.143) 
-.551** 
(.111) 
Unionisation -.059** (-078) 
-.081** 
(-.077) 
-.047* 
(-.076) 
-.016 
(-.084) 
-.032 
(-.095) 
Economic Globalisation .054*** (-.017) 
.010 
(-.015) 
.051*** 
(-.020) 
.038 
(-.045) 
-.020 
(-.060) 
Trade openness .017** (.016) 
.009 
(.015) 
.016** 
(.017) 
.021*** 
(.022) 
.006 
(.017) 
Unemployment .087*** (.016) 
.076*** 
(.023) 
.093*** 
(.018) 
.074** 
(.035) 
.059* 
(.044) 
Female labour force .092** (.019) 
.081** 
(.020) 
.078** 
(.028) 
-.014 
(.019) 
-.001 
(.071) 
Market capitalisation - .011*** (.001) - - - 
Domestic credit volume - - .004 (-.002) - - 
FIRE gross operating 
surplus - - - 
.185*** 
(.032) 
.161*** 
(.061) 
Labour’s share of GNI - - - - -.207*** (-.183) 
C 4.053** (.067) 
7.149*** 
(-.028) 
4.848** 
(.076) 
5.338 
(.070) 
21.673*** 
(.028) 
+ First-difference (FD) parameter estimates in parentheses. 
*10%; **5%; ***.01% 
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(2) Financial regulation and redistribution 
 Top 1% income share 
 1 2 3 4 
Government consumption -.099 (.510) 
-.009 
(-.431) 
-.517** 
(.389) 
-.593** 
(.387) 
Unionisation -.058* (-.043) 
-.204*** 
(.005) 
-.045 
(-.016) 
-.047 
(-.017) 
Economic Globalisation -.042* (-.019) 
.031 
(-.067) 
-.011 
(-.041) 
-.048 
(-.044) 
Economic growth .059** (.070) 
.029 
(.022) 
.063 
(.088) 
.070 
(.088) 
Market capitalisation .008*** (.007) 
.009*** 
(.005) 
.011*** 
(.010) 
.012*** 
(.009) 
Log financial globalisation 
(1990-2004) 
1.528*** 
(.647) - - - 
Capital taxation - -.179** (-.067) - - 
Indirect taxation - -.169*** (-.005) - - 
Post-tax personal income 
inequality - 
.238*** 
(.468) - - 
Extent of banking sector 
liberalisation (90-05) - - 
.546** 
(.076) - 
Extent of banking 
supervision (90-05) - - 
.393** 
(-.020) - 
Financial reform index (90-
05) - - - 
.229* 
(.685) 
C 5.431*** (-.213) 
12.531*** 
(.009) 
12.950*** 
(-.290) 
12.411*** 
(-.241) 
+ First-difference (FD) parameter estimates in parentheses. 
*10%; **5%; ***.01% 
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Online Supplement 2: Endogeneity check for post-tax income inequality (Gini) 
 
 
Model 2, table 2+ 
 y = top 1% y = top .1% 
Government consumption -.009 (-.07) 
-.019 
(-.20) 
Unionisation -.204*** (-7.26) 
-.079*** 
(-5.44) 
Economic Globalisation .031 (1.34) 
.018 
(1.19) 
Economic growth .029 (1.24) 
.032 
(1.61) 
Market capitalisation .009*** (8.50) 
.006*** 
(3.62) 
Log financial globalisation (1990-
2004) - - 
Capital taxation -.179** (-2.61) 
-.020 
(-.42) 
Indirect taxation -.169*** (-4.37) 
-.093*** 
(-3.79) 
Post-tax personal income 
inequality 
.238*** 
(3.27) 
.120*** 
(3.96) 
Extent of banking sector 
liberalisation (90-05) - - 
Extent of banking supervision 
(90-05) - - 
Financial reform index (90-05) - - 
C 12.531*** (3.51) 
1.115 
(.55) 
p-value (F/Chi2) .000 .000 
Obs 222 182 
Groups 12 10 
R2 .905 .873 
*10%; **5%; ***.01% 
+ Data for the top .1% are not available for Finland, Ireland, and New Zealand 
 
 
 
